A third sign, this one of the hard economic variety, is the value of the Iraqi dinar, especially as compared with the regions other major currencies. In the final years of Saddam Husseins rule, the Iraqi dinar was in free fall; after 1995, it was no longer even traded in Iran and Kuwait. By contrast, the new dinar, introduced early in 2004, is doing well against both the Kuwaiti dinar and the Iranian rial, having risen by 17 percent against the former and by 23 percent against the latter. Although it is still impossible to fix its value against a basket of international currencies, the new Iraqi dinar has done well against the U.S. dollar, increasing in value by almost 18 percent between August 2004 and August 2005. The overwhelming majority of Iraqis, and millions of Iranians and Kuwaitis, now treat it as a safe and solid medium of exchange.

Then there is business activity:

My fourth time-tested sign is the level of activity by small and medium-sized businesses. In the past, whenever things have gone downhill in Iraq, large numbers of such enterprises have simply closed down, with the countrys most capable entrepreneurs decamping to Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf states, Turkey, Iran, and even Europe and North America. Since liberation, however, Iraq has witnessed a private-sector boom, especially among small and medium-sized businesses.

A host of related economic indicators also look promising:

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, as well as numerous private studies, the Iraqi economy has been doing better than any other in the region. The country’s gross domestic product rose to almost $90 billion in 2004 (the latest year for which figures are available), more than double the output for 2003, and its real growth rate, as estimated by the IMF, was 52.3 per cent. In that same period, exports increased by more than $3 billion, while the inflation rate fell to 25.4 percent, down from 70 percent in 2002. The unemployment rate was halved, from 60 percent to 30 percent.

The final economic indicator pertains to the agricultural sector:

Related to this is the level of agricultural activity. Between 1991 and 2003, the countrys farm sector experienced unprecedented decline, in the end leaving almost the entire nation dependent on rations distributed by the United Nations under Oil-for-Food. In the past two years, by contrast, Iraqi agriculture has undergone an equally unprecedented revival. Iraq now exports foodstuffs to neighboring countries, something that has not happened since the 1950s. Much of the upturn is due to smallholders who, shaking off the collectivist system imposed by the Baathists, have retaken control of land that was confiscated decades ago by the state.

To his credit Taheri is aware that the meausures he points to, objective though they may be, will not persuade everyone:

That an experienced observer of Iraq with a sense of history can point to so many positive factors in the country’s present condition will not do much, of course, to sway the more determined critics of the U.S. intervention there. They might even agree that the images fed to the American public show only part of the picture, and that the news from Iraq is not uniformly bad. But the root of their opposition runs deeper, to political fundamentals.

Indeed it does run this deep. Reasonable people can and should hold differing opinions about not only whether progress is being made but also about what constitutes progress in the first place. To my mind Taheri's assessment must be taken with more than a grain of salt but as less than the definitive or final word.

Commentary
Debates about measures and outcomes are common fare in the social sciences. Anyone who would take issue with Taheri's analysis or conclusion would do best to challenge it along some or all of the following lines:

1) Argue that regardless of how well the measures capture social and economic health of Iraq, there are other health indicators that are more important, e.g. measures political or religious or even public health.

2) Argue that the measures are irrelevant and/or meaningless and propose others that better capture social and economic health of the nation.

3) Argue that the measures are correct but have been mismeasured. i.e. show that small businesses are not experiencing a boom or that agricultural exports, while increased, are miniscule.

4) Argue that while the measures are trending in the correct direction, there are other forces at work which militate against the trend continuing.

5) Argue that while the measures are accurate and the outcomes laudable, the costs to create the benefits are unacceptably high.

I don't expect the mainstream media in the US to engage Taheri on this issue, but perhaps members of the blogosphere will. Technorati shows over 80 links to this article as of May 21st. That's an excellent start.

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